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Abstract—Tampering of metering infrastructure of an electri-
cal distribution system can significantly cause customers’ billing
discrepancy. The large-scale deployment of smart meters may
potentially be tampered by malware by propagating their agents
to other IP-based meters. Such a possibility is to pivot through the
physical perimeters of a smart meter. While this framework may
help utilities to accurately energy consumption information on the
regular basis, it is challenging to identify malicious meters when
there is a large number of users that are exploited to vulnerability
and kWh information being altered. This paper presents a recon-
figuration switching scheme based on graph theory incorporating
the concept of distributed generators to accelerate the anomaly
localization process within an electrical distribution network.
First, a data form transformation from a visualized grid topology
to a graph with vertices and edges is presented. A conversion
from the graph representation to machine recognized matrix
representation is then performed. The connection of the grid
topology is illustrated as an adjacency or incidence matrix for the
following analysis. A switching procedure to change elements in
the topological matrix is used to detect and localize the tampered
node or cluster. The procedure has to meet the electrical and
the temporary closed-loop operational constraints. The customer-
level anomaly detection is then performed in accordance with
probability derived from smart meter anomalies.
Index Terms—Advanced metering infrastructure, tampering
detection, switching scheme, distributed generators.
I. INTRODUCTION
ENERGY thieves have been known as the major pitfallsfor developing countries as the illegal electricity users are
not part of the payment to utilities [1]. Similarly, alteration
of individual’s electronic energy usage on a smart meter is
a covert, fraudulent behavior. Such motivation is to avoid
full payment over the course of a long period of time.
While smart meters provide the technology to conveniently
obtain kWh information to utility billing center, poor physical
perimeters may enable individuals to tamper the smart meters.
Collectively, such an attack can get more creative that may be
propagated through the Intranet of all associated smart meter
devices to be enumerated by pivoting through a compromised
smart meter [2], [3]. Massive tampering can occur within the
home area network (HAN) and neighborhood area network
(NAN). Although this may not affect overall reliability of
a distribution network, it would implicate the collection of
monthly payments from utility’s customers, leading to signif-
icant lower revenue as part of the financial losses [4], [5]. On
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the other extreme, the discrepancy may trigger complaints by
other customers who do not use usage much but amplified by
the malware agents to significantly higher usage.
The metering data has the risk of being tampered during
the process of measurement, collection, storage, or transmis-
sion while the malware or the worm propagation is usually
embedded in the data string of the plausible legitimate meter-
ing data. In time-critical communications, the data collection
devices usually have access for security, the inquire of data is
restricted. Therefore, it is hard to detect the existed malware
in these devices. Mike Davis demonstrated the speed of the
malware can break a smart meter’s safeguard and worms
propagation through the loophole in 2009 at Blackhat [6]
while the Stuxnet worm attacked the metering units in the
power system in 2010 [7], [8]. Different than conventional
malicious attacks, several smart meters might share the same
identity number or a mechanical unit may generate one or
more additional identity number to cause Distributed Denial-
of-Service (DDoS) attack. DDoS only affects the unavail-
ability of smart meters. However, this attack can be utilized
to reduce the share of resources in the topology and give
attackers more information to perform other attacks [9], [10].
A McAfee report warned that an attacker could exploit smart
meters easily and takes control of the whole system [11].
Since the system specifications, diverse network protocols, and
operational constraints in AMI, the existing defense methods
against malicious attacks cannot be applied directly. The main
motivation of this work is not to provide a defend method to
improve the cybersecurity of the grid network. It proposed a
switching operation scheme to detect and localize the occurred
attacks or tampering behaviors within a distribution system.
An assumption is that the AMI and SCADA systems have
been fully deployed in the test area, however,the SCADA was
developed using a comprehensive security policy to protect
the system from the cyber attacks or any other threatens,
while the validation for smart meters remains in the early
stage. The main contribution of this paper is to combine
the tamper detection method with the topology reconstruc-
tion switching procedure to locate subfeeder or clusters with
malicious meters in a distribution system. The distributed
generators are considered in this study to reduce the switching
combinations. The rest of this paper is structured as follows:
Related works are presented in Section II. The switching
strategies are formularized in Section III. A case study with
a virtual distribution network is discussed in Section IV. The
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2conclusion and the future work are presented in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Researchers to prevent anomalous electricity usages have
done many existing methods. Artificial intelligence based
machine learning and big data analysis [12] have been widely
used for intelligent data analysis and data mining to iden-
tify normal consumption patterns, thus an obvious deviation
between the normal pattern and the measuring data can be
considered as an anomaly. Authors in [13] using machine
learning techniques on the past data to built models for
detecting anomalous meter readings. A distributed intelligent
framework using benford’s law and stackelberg game to detect
electricity theft was proposed in [14]. A technique can identify
diverse forms and caused deviations from tampered activities
by using artificial neural networks [15] and Kalman filter [16].
The abnormal reports from the load areas with high tampered
probabilities can be trained in support vector machine (SVM)
[3] for classification. Another main strategy of detecting
malicious meters is based on the real-time comparison. In
[17], the (feeder) remote terminal unit (RTU/FRTU) provides
a strategy to narrow down the search area for energy theft in
a smart community. Also, [2] compares the real values with
the predicted results to infer the possible tampered activities.
The methods to distinguish the legitimate data from metering
devices and the malware-carrying data string and using a
disassembler to assist mathematical analysis are described in
[18]. Different than data based detection approaches, [19]
provides the attack and intrusion detection mechanism for a
smart grid neighborhood area network (NAN). In addition,
some strategies based on graph theory have been developed.
In [20], a novel inspection algorithm identifies each meter with
a unique binary-coded number to locate the unique malicious
meter is proposed. The conversion between the power grid
and binary tree or spanning tree is adopted in [3]. Sensors can
also be used to detect anomalies in customer levels and even
in networks and communication levels. However, the deploy
and maintenance fee of a complete sensor system could be
expensive and false alarms may occur in the inspection process
[21].
The reconfiguration switching scheme in the distribution
system is mainly applied for the emergency operation and
optimization process [22]. The main purpose to exploit this
problem is to achieve optimization. In [23], the authors
deal with the problem existed in the radial topology of the
distribution network with minimum losses while [24], [25]
demonstrated a strategy to optimize the cost for equipment and
devices installation and maintenance via changing the states
of switching devices. In [26] introduces methods to restore
maximum load with minimum steps of switching procedures.
III. SWITCHING STRATEGIES FOR TAMPERED NODE
LOCALIZATION
The profile-based anomaly detection to detect the irregular-
ity of potentially tampered data by comparing the summation
of all smart meters results with the metering result shown in
the FRTU at the feeder head [27]. If the offset is quite different
(much larger or smaller) than the pre-defined threshold, the
reconfiguration switching scheme is utilized to localize the
subfeeder, microgrid [28], cluster, or the distribution node with
tampered load(s) or malicious meter(s). Since the operational
complexity and the cost during the topological reconfiguration,
the proposed method is performed once the discrepancy is
larger than 20% of the normal power consumption (which
will cause massive tampering). All electrical utilities keep
the power on during the switching procedures while meeting
the closed-loop electrical and operational constraints in the
distribution grid [29], [30].
A. Convert the Distribution Network To a Graph
A distribution grid is a radial topology and constructed
by different feeders and microgrids. The adjacent feeders are
connected with each other through tie switches (normally open
and can be closed under emergency situation). The distribution
grid can be represented by a graph G = (V,E), which only
contains nodes and edges. In G, all distributed power resources
and loads are denoted as nodes/vertices V while all nodes are
connected by feeder lines with openable tie switches, which
are referred to as edges E. The graph is stored in matrix
form (adjacency and/or incidence matrix) to straightforward
demonstrate the connection relationships between nodes and
edges [31].
An example of a distribution network with two feeders
and the corresponding adjacency and incidence matrices are
shown in Fig. 1. The sparse visualization of the adjacency and
incidence matrices for the provided virtual topology is also
illustrated in Fig. 1. The FRTU1 is responsible to monitor
the consumption states of all customers in the blue area while
the FRTU2 metering the green area. The detailed structure of
the secondary network (customer level) for each load is shown
in the gray block. In other words, the metering results in FRTU
should be equal or slightly different than the summation of all
smart meters’ results under the supervised zone. It should be
noted that the order of vertices and edges may change the form
of matrices but can not change the topology of the graph. In
this example, the order of vertices following the numbering
sequence in this figure while the S1 to S5 represent edges
2 to 7. The FRTU1 and FRTU2 represent edge 1 and 7,
respectively. Two vertices V3 and V4 and their connection S1
(edge 2) is displayed on the visualized sparse matrices. The
nonzero elements of these two matrices represent the number
of edges in the graph. Since the graph is undirected, each edge
is counted twice. This example is used for the case study in
this paper.
B. Tampered Node Localization with Switching Strategies
The Algorithm 1 illustrates the iterative process of how
the node with tampered load(s) is localized based on the
distribution switching procedure. The detailed descriptions of
variables are shown as below:
Mi Topological incidence matrix to represent the connec-
tion states between nodes: i is denoted as a node/vertex
and j denoted as an edge. If node i is connected
3Fig. 1: Sparse visualization of the adjacency and incidence matrices for the provided virtual topology.
by edge j to other node(s), Mi[i, j] = 1, otherwise,
Mi[i, j] = 0.
Ma Topological adjacent matrix to represent the connec-
tion states between nodes: both i and j are denoted
as nodes/vertices. If node i is connected with node j
, Ma[i, j] = 1, otherwise, Ma[i, j] = 0.
Vr A defined row vector with length |E| to indicate the
connection states (open or close) of switches (edges)
in the distribution topology. If switch i is open Vr[i]
= 0, otherwise, Vr[i] = 1.
Vs A defined row vector with length |V | to indicate the
locations of all distributed power resources in the
distribution topology. If node i connected with a power
source, Vs[i] = 1, otherwise, Vs[i] = 0.
If Index of RTU/FRTU that indicates there exists tam-
pered load(s).
Vg A defined row vector with length |V | to indicate the
location of distributed generators. If vertex i connected
with a distributed generators, then Vg[i] = 1, otherwise,
Vg[i] = 0.
The algorithm starts with balancing the benefits of detecting
the fraud, only the detected power losses are more than 20%,
the process is performed. The algorithm is summarized as
follows:
1) Isolate all subfeeders or clusters with distributed gen-
erators, if If shows no tampered load(s), the tampered
load(s) exists in the isolated subfeeders or clusters.
2) Restore the connection of each microgrid sequentially
and check If to identify which microgrid has the tam-
pered load(s).
3) If the tampered load(s) is not in the isolated area,
perform the iteration function to localize the tampered
node.
4) Convert the topological incidence matrix to adjacency
form and update the current states of all switches for
detecting the possible tampered node;
5) Initialize Vf with Vs and set V̂f as the previous iteration
result of Vf and initialize V̂f with 0;
6) Check the status of every node during each iteration by
checking Vf = V̂f ;
7) If values of all nodes in the row vector are unchanged
in the following iterations, use 1 to replace all nonzero
elements in Vf ;
8) If there are more than one tampered nodes within a
single feeder, update If to generate a new Vr and then
repeat Ff (Mi, Vr, Vs, If );
9) Return Vf ;
10) 0 element(s) in Vf to represent the location(s) of tam-
pered node(s).
C. Customer-Level Anomaly Detection
In this study, we assume all customers have smart meters.
Continue the profile-based tampering detection process in
consumers’ level by comparing the historical consumption
records with the current period report after the localization of
tampered node in the load (or lumped load) level. The anomaly
score and the attacking probability of smart meters will be
considered at the beginning of the customer-level anomaly
detection to improve the searching efficiency. The searching
process will start from the distribution node covers the smart
meters with the highest anomaly index. The anomaly score of
the smart meter can be estimated by a statistical approach. The
ratio between the recorded number of anomalous readings and
the total number of readings over a test period represents the
score. The anomaly score can be represented as (1):
Sa =
Na,t
Nr,t
(1)
where Na,t is number of anomalous readings of a smart meter
in a time duration t and Nr,t represents the total number of
metering results.
4Algorithm 1 Tampered Node Localization Algorithm
Input:
Mi, Vr, Vs, If
1: Isolate all subfeeders or clusters with distributed genera-
tors.
2: if If shows no tampered load(s) in this system.
then
3: Vf = Vg .
4: Restore the connection of each subfeeder or cluster
sequentially and check If .
5: else
Iteration Fuction: Ff (Mi, Vr, Vs, If )
6: Vr(If ) = 0;
7: . Vr keeps updating;
8: . Convert the topological incidence matrix to adjacency
form and update the current states of all switches;
9: Mi ←Mi · V Tr .
10: Ma ←Mi ·MTi .
11: Replace all diagonal elements in Ma with 0.
12: . Initialization;
13: Vf ← Vs.
14: V̂f ← Vf · 0.
15: . Check if the status is same as the previous iteration.
16: while Vf − V̂f 6= 0 do
17: V̂f ← Vf .
18: Vf ← V̂f ·Ma + V̂f .
19: end while
20: Replace all nonzero elements in Vf with 1.
21: return Vf .
22: . Localize the tampered node.
23: Find all 0 elements in Vf .
24: while More than one tampered nodes in one feeder,
change If to generate a new Vr. do
25: Repeat Ff (Ma, Vr, Vs, If ).
26: end while
27: end if
Assume the alarm system in each smart meter is sensitive,
the attacking probability indicates the probability that an alarm
occurs during a time duration of t, which can be estimated as
(2):
Pa = 1−
∏
(1−Qm), m = 1, 2, 3, · · · . (2)
where Qm represents the occurrence probability of type m
alarm, which can be estimated from the statistics and ob-
servations of archived data. There might be more than one
tampering on one node.
IV. A CASE STUDY
A test case is utilized to validate the proposed strategy for
detecting tampered meters based on the switching procedure.
The schemes of changing connection status of switches in the
distribution topology have to keep the whole system power on
and meet the electrical and operational constraints.
A. Test Case Description
Fig. 2 is the topology of the distribution test network. There
are two feeders and six load nodes. The two remote-controlled
switches at each feeder head are deployed with a FRTU. An
alarm system based on the profile-based tampering detection
is also installed in FRTU. The load node with the distributed
generator can generate the microgrids. A random generated
massive tampering alarm is sent from FRTU2.
The corresponding input incidence matrix can be gathered
from the previous section. The input row vectors of the first
scenario in Fig. 2 are as Vs = [1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1] since V1
and V2 are two power sources; Vr = [1 1 1 0 1 1 1] due to
the normally open tie switch S3; If = 7 for the random fraud
alarm and Vg = 7 because of the distributed generator. In the
second scenario, the Vs, If , and Vg remain unchanged while
Vr = [1 1 1 1 0 0 1] since the switching procedure.
B. Switching Procedures
Since the topology of the test system keeps unchanged, the
input incidence matrix has no changes. The difference between
each iteration is the updated connecting status Vr.
1) Step 1: Under the operational constraints, connect the
tie switch between these two feeders in order to keep the test
system power on during this procedure.
2) Step 2: Isolate the load node V6 since it connected with
a distributed generator which can supply the power for this
microgrid.
3) Step 3: Perform the profile-based tampering detection at
FRTU2, if FRTU2 shows normally, the tampered loads are
not in V7.
4) Step 4: Perform the profile-based tampering detection at
FRTU1, if FRTU1 shows normally, the tampered loads are
in V6; If not, the tampered loads are in V5.
In this work, a simple virtual distribution network is applied,
since the key point of the proposed method is to find out
the best sequence of the switching procedure and change the
states of openable edges, the different sequence will cause
different searching time: the time could be exponential or only
spend a linear time in a real distribution network. This is the
preliminary work that intends to prove the feasibility of the
proposed idea.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a new application is presented to infer
tampered node within distribution AMI network using graph-
theoretic framework. The data-based tampering detection
method is utilized to help indicate the existing of attacks
or tampered activities in the system. The consideration of
subfeeders, clusters, or microgrids with distributed generators
will reduce the number of combinations during the switching
procedures that can accelerate the localization of the spot with
energy theft. In the process of localizing the tampered load
node, the distribution network is converted to a graph only
contains vertices and edges. The graph is demonstrated as
incidence or adjacency matrix for the analysis. A localization
of tampered nodes within a network is introduced.
5Fig. 2: Switching procedures to localize the tampered load node in the example topology.
Validations can be further extended in the future to study
a large-scale distribution framework using the proposed al-
gorithm. The consideration of electrical and operational con-
straints, corresponding combination strategy, as well as a
heuristic search algorithm will be incorporated as part of the
future work. The real topology of a distribution system can
be drawn based on a real map in the geographic information
system (GIS). An agent-based model which can be integrated
with multiple modules into a single simulation environment
such as the GridLAB-D [32] to generate random tampered
nodes and perform the power flow to meet the constraint
requirements in the provided network will be conducted.
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